Showing posts with label Commonwealth. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Commonwealth. Show all posts

Wednesday, 4 May 2016

What the High Court of Australia has not determined in relation toManus Island

What the High Court did not decide in 2014

As observed in an previous post, it is important to keep clearly in mind what the High Court of Australia did not decide in S156/2013. It drew from the summary of facts that since his arrival on Manus Island, the plaintiff ["P"] had resided at the immigration processing centre, where he was effectively detained.  As to the administrative arrangements, the Court further noted that in the stated case, it was said that an officer of the PNG Immigration Department had the day-to-day management and control of the Centre, and that Australia had appointed a co-ordinator to assist that officer.   The duties of that person included managing all Australian officials and service providers at the Centre.  Significantly,  their Honours noted:

The extent to which Australia participates in the continued detention of the plaintiff is not evident from these facts or the Administrative Arrangements between PNG and Australia to which they relate. 

They correctly observed that the Stated Case did  not raise questions as to who detained P, or the authority under which he was detained.  The issues before the court were limited to the legality of his removal from Australia, and not his circumstances following that removal, in other words the removal decision.


Subdivision B, that part of the Migration Act that was under consideration, contained no reference to what was to happen to persons such as P following their removal from Australia to a regional processing country. It contained no provisions dealing with their custody and detention, or the processing of their claims to refugee status.  While certain "Administrative Arrangements" had been entered into between PNG and Australia in April 2013, the questions reserved for the Court did not address those Administrative Arrangements. They turned solely upon the validity of legislative provisions of the Migration Act, and decisions made pursuant to them, all of which concerned removal from Australia, and not what subsequently befell those removed. The subdivision said nothing further about what was to happen to such persons in regional processing countries, such as PNG.


When seeking leave  to further amend his Statement of  Claim, P had sought to argue that the impugned  sections did  not  authorise  the Executive to,  in effect, imprison  persons in third countries against their will, and for an indefinite period.  The Full Court noted that the Chief Justice had  refused leave to  amend on  this point  because the plaintiff's submission did not  engage with the  question  of  the invalidity  of  the  provisions under consideration.     The Full Court agreed with his Honour that the  contention was untenable, because neither of the impugned sections made any  provision for imprisonment in  third  countries. 

P also argued that there  was no evidence that  PNG would  fulfil its assurances,  and would promote the  maintenance of  a programme  that was fair to those removed and subsequently detained.  However, the Full Court held that there was no statutory  requirement that the  Minister be satisfied of  these  matters in order validly to  exercise the relevant  power, as they  did not qualify as jurisdictional facts. 

As contended at the time, in previous post, all was not lost by the decision of the High Court of Australia in this case.  It determined only that the provisions under which P had been removed from Australia were constitutionally valid.  It was not required to, and did not determine under the case stated that his subsequent detention in PNG was lawful, either under the Constitution of Australia, or that of PNG. That the detention of persons such as P under the Constitution of PNG was unlawful has now been determined, and  adversely to both the Commonwealth and the government of PNG by the Supreme Court of PNG.  Whether it is unlawful under the Constitution of Australia for the Commonwealth to detain non-citizens such as P in PNG remains to be determined.

Monday, 4 May 2015

How nominal is “nominal” in nominal damages?



In Fernando v Commonwealth (No 5) [“Fernando”] the trial judge, upon remittal by a Full Court, awarded the applicant nominal damages of $1.00 after a finding that he had been falsely imprisoned by the Commonwealth for 1,203 days. 

His Honour held that Mr Fernando had suffered no damage or loss sounding in substantial damages, as it had been open to the Common-wealth to have lawfully imprisoned him had it so chosen.  The damages award was upheld by a second Full Court.  

Mr Fernando’s litigation representative has applied for special leave to appeal on the question of whether an award of nominal damages was appropriate in the circumstances.  However, the question remains: did an award of $1 amount to nominal damages, or was it rather not consistent with an award of contemptuous damages?

In New South Wales v Stevens[“Stevens”] the State appealed against an award of $10,000 by way of nominal damages after the State had admitted liability.  The Court of Appeal considered the circumstances in which an award of nominal damages was appropriate, and then determined the appropriate amount for such an award.  After considering the cases,  it concluded that in 2012 nominal meant, for the purposes of the case under consideration,  $100, and substituted that amount for the $10,000 ordered by the primary judge.

In Kambouris v Tahmazis, after considering Stevens, the trial judged concluded, subject to the submissions of counsel, that an identical award would be appropriate in that case.

The vast disproportion between the award in Fernando, and the awards in the other two cases, suggests that primary judge in the former may have misunderstood the distinction between nominal damages and contemptuous damages, an award of $1.00 being more appropriate to an award of contemptuous damages.  In Habib v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 2) the Court of Appeal noted, citing Connolly v Sunday Times that: “Contemptuous damages  are tantamount to an expression of disapproval of, or contempt for, the plaintiff.”  That the primary judge ordered the Commonwealth to pay Mr Fernando’s costs on an indemnity basis is hardly consistent with any such disapproval.

As the Court of Appeal noted in Habib the authorities that refer to contemptuous damages tend to refer to amounts of one shilling:  Connelly v Sunday Times; a farthing:  Martin v Benson; or a halfpenny:  Pamplin v Express Newspapers Ltd (No 2).   Their Honours concluded that:  “A comparable amount in Australia would be $1.

On the authorities, Mr Fernando has been short changed in more ways than one?